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Review of McCormick et al.
The last decade has seen an increase in
studies investigating the neural correlates
of mind wandering. Many studies have
implicated the default network (DN), par-
ticularly the medial temporal lobe (MTL)
subsystem of the DN (DNMTL), as a pri-
mary network activated when someone’s
mind is wandering (Christoff et al., 2009).
The DNMTL comprises the hippocampus,
parahippocampal cortex, retrosplenial cor-
tex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and the
posterior inferior parietal lobe (Andrews-
Hanna, 2012). Although the DNMTL as a
whole has been linked to mind wandering,
more precise roles of its specific nodes have
not yet been elucidated.
Consideration of the typical content of
mind wandering suggests likely roles for
specific brain areas. Mind wandering
content often includes (but is not limited
to) prospection, episodic and semantic
memories, introspection, and fantasies
(Stawarczyk et al., 2011; Andrews-Hanna
et al., 2013). Different ranges of temporal
directions (past, present, future) may be
experienced, with variations in episodic
nature and personal relevance (e.g., being
reminded of a movie versus remembering
that you went to see that movie with
friends last year), and modality (e.g.,
thoughts that are primarily visual or ver-
bal). Thus it is likely that the hippocam-
pus, given its involvement in episodic and
associative memory, helps to generate the
content of mind wandering (Mills et al.,
2018). Indeed, the generation of episodic,
visual thoughts about the past or future
relies on the hippocampus. For example,
the hippocampus is critically involved in
mental time travel and visual scene recon-
struction (Hassabis et al., 2007; Schacter
et al., 2007). Moreover, hippocampal dam-
age impairs the ability to vividly recall past
events (Lah and Miller, 2008), imagine the
future (Kurczek et al., 2015), and mentally
construct novel visual scenes (Hassabis et
al., 2007). In addition, famous patients with
MTL damage (H.M. and K.C.) were previ-
ously described as being stuck in a “perma-
nent present-tense”or“permanentpresence”
(Tulving, 1985;Corkin, 2013).
If the hippocampus plays a critical role
in the generation of mind wandering con-
tent, then people with hippocampal dam-
age may be expected to mind wander less
about past and future, episodic, visual
events than healthy controls. To test this
prediction,McCormick et al. (2018) stud-
ied mind wandering in six patients with
bilateral hippocampal damage. The pa-
tients were shadowed over two days dur-
ing which they were asked to report what
was on their minds at 20 time points. For
each thought, the researchers determined
whether it was linked to ongoing percep-
tion, such as objects or sounds in the
room. Mind wandering was defined as
thoughts that were not tied to concur-
rent perceptions. Temporal range (past,
present, future), representation type
(whether thoughts were knowledge-
based vs grounded in experience;
henceforth: semantic vs episodic), self-
relatedness, and form of thought (visual
or verbal) were also noted.
The authors compared the frequency
and content of mind wandering in pa-
tients to that in 12 control participants.
Patients did not mind wander signifi-
cantly more or less than healthy controls.
However, theirmindwanderingwasmore
often related to the present and less about
the past than controls. Patients also re-
ported more atemporal and hypothetical
thinking. Thinking about the future was
infrequent for both groups. Compared
with controls, patients reported fewer
visual and more verbal thoughts.
Within-subject comparisons revealed
that controls mostly reported visual
scenes, whereas patients were more
likely to report verbal thoughts com-
pared with ones consisting of visual
scenes or objects. In patients, thoughts
were also more semantic than episodic,
andmore self-related than non-self-related.
The observation that hippocampal
damage is related to more atemporal, se-
mantic, and verbal mind wandering sug-
gests that the hippocampus might indeed
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play a role in the generation of specific
types of mind wandering content. Impor-
tantly, the simple probability of mind wan-
dering remained completely unchanged
across individuals with and without hip-
pocampal damage, providing some initial
empirical support for the idea that where,
rather than whether, your thoughts “wan-
der” may be determined by the hippocam-
pus (Christoff et al., 2016).
The results from McCormick et al.
(2018) shed light on how the DNMTL
might give rise to mind wandering. Evi-
dence from single-cell recordings has
shown that spontaneousmemories are pre-
ceded by activation of hippocampal neu-
rons that were active during encoding
(Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008). Similarly, re-
cent work found that the left and right hip-
pocampiwere active 2 s before the onset of a
spontaneous thought (Ellamil et al., 2016).
The findings by McCormick et al. (2018)
suggest that this activity might be related to
mental time travel and the construction of
mental scenes that constitute the content of
much of mind wandering.
A recent proposal suggests that the
hippocampus may also generate the vari-
ability in content that we experience dur-
ingmindwandering episodes (Christoff et
al., 2016). This variability arises when the
activation of one hippocampal-neocor-
tical ensemble triggers the activation of
another because they partially overlap.
This auto-associative process is also known
as pattern completion (Marr, 1971), and
can lead to thoughts that are conceptually
disconnected from the here and now
(Christoff et al., 2016; Mills et al., 2018).
Impairments in this processmight explain
whymindwandering in patients with hip-
pocampal damage tends to be about the
present and themselves, rather than about
more (temporally or personally) distant
events.
Along with the hippocampus, the ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is
part of the DNMTL subsystem. Interest-
ingly, mind wandering in patients with
vmPFC damage also tends to be less about
the future and more about the present
than healthy or patient controls with brain
damage outside the vmPFC (mainly in the
occipital cortex; Bertossi and Ciaramelli,
2016). One possible explanation for this
similarity is that disrupting connectivity be-
tween the hippocampus and vmPFC biases
mind wandering toward the present. Previ-
ous work has shown that the strength of
functional connections between the hip-
pocampus and vmPFC is related to the de-
gree of mental time travel during mind
wandering (Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017).
The vmPFC might not be directly involved
in the generation of content, but rather in
other processes that underlie spontaneous
cognition, such as those associated with the
explicit awareness of the content of thought,
known as meta-awareness (Christoff et al.,
2009; McCaig et al., 2011). Indeed, in con-
trast to patients with hippocampal damage,
patients with vmPFC damage report less
mind wandering in general (Bertossi and
Ciaramelli, 2016). Thus, given the vmPFC
link to meta-awareness during mind wan-
dering, one possible explanation for the
lower rates of mind wandering reported by
individualswith vmPFCdamage is that they
are simply not aware that theirmind iswan-
deringdue toa lackofmeta-awareness (Ber-
tossi and Ciaramelli, 2016).
As McCormick et al. (2018) have
shown, the role of the hippocampus in
mind wandering concerns the content of
mind wandering rather than its rate of
occurrence.According to thedynamic frame-
workof spontaneous thought (Christoff et al.,
2016), thoughts can be constrained deliber-
ately (e.g., thoughts that are driven by goal-
directed processes) as well as automatically
(e.g., thoughts that are drawn in a particular
direction due to factors such as affective sa-
lience that are outside of deliberate control).
Thoughts that are highly automatically con-
strained (e.g., worrying about something)
are thought to arise from interactions be-
tween the coreDN subsystem (consisting of
anterior mPFC, posterior cingulate cortex,
and posterior inferior parietal lobule) and
the salience network, which feed into the
frontoparietal control network and the
DNMTL. In contrast, thoughts that aredelib-
erately constrained are drivenby the fronto-
parietal control network, feeding into the
salience networks and core DN subsystem.
Mind wandering is predicted to arise when
both types of constraints are relativelyweak,
so the mind can move about more freely.
Indeed, a meta-analysis of studies of rapid-
eye-movement sleep, during which most
dreams occur, suggests that the DNMTL is
more strongly recruited when deliberate
constraints on thoughts are relatively weak
(such as during dreaming), perhaps giving
rise to variability in content (Fox et al., 2013;
Christoff et al., 2016).
An important question to consider is
what happens to our experience when the
DNMTL is no longer there to guide less
constrained thoughts? McCormick et al.
(2018) have provided some critical insight
into this question. In the absence of a
functioning DNMTL, thoughts that would
normally be driven by the DNMTL might
become more constrained by sources of
automatic (e.g., by salience) and deliberate
(e.g., by goal-directedness) constraints in-
stead. Indeed, examples from McCormick
et al. (2018) are in line with this suggestion.
Patients’ thoughts like “I’m thinking that
you are right-handed”, “I wonder what this
box with all these cables does. But I have no
idea.” are highly constrained in terms of sa-
lience compared with control participants’
thoughts. Similarly, thoughts like “Iwonder
whether I should eat another grape” and
“I’m trying to avoid getting depressed
about [how relationships change]” are quite
goal-directed.
Critically, this also touches upon the
question what constitutes mind wandering.
Although a definitive answer is beyond the
scope of this paper, it is important to note
that the definition of mind wandering as
perceptually decoupled thought may not
capture someof the key qualities of the phe-
nomenon. Recent work has suggested that
mind wandering thoughts may not only
vary in to what extent they are perceptually
decoupled and task-related, but also how
freely the mindmoves from one thought to
thenext (Mills et al., 2017).Amore in-depth
analysis of the content of thoughts and how
they dynamically unfold over time may re-
veal qualitative differences inmindwander-
ing that could shed light on how it arises in
patients with damage in theDNMTL. This in
turn could inform theories about the critical
role of the hippocampus andotherDNsub-
systems that have been closely linked to
mind wandering thus far.
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